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AUTHOR Mushaben, Joyce Marie
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ABSTRACT

The effects of the West German peace movement over the past 30 years have led to the development of a new concept of political participation in that country. Since 1950, a proliferation of protest movements has reflected a wide range of ideological, social, and geographic perspectives. Pacifist Protestants and the German Trade Union began sporadic activities in 1952 fearing that planned rearmament would result in permanent division of Germany. By 1957, scientists and scholars were protesting atomic weapons. Through the 1960s, the major avenue of dissent was the Easter March Movement which evolved from a vague peace movement to a vehicle for opposing the Viet Nam war. Protest at the end of the war in 1972 shifted toward nuclear energy and environmental hazards--issues that attracted new followers and sixties activists. The present peace movement is a coalition of groups. Its broad base of concerns, of which the 1983 deployment of U.S. missiles is most pressing, has contributed directly to the institutionalization of dissent through the "Green" and Alternative Parties. This institutionalization, in turn, should lead to changes in the political opportunity structure, as system parties incorporate protest concerns into their agendas in order to compete. (LP)

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CYCLES OF PEACE PROTEST IN WEST GERMANY: EXPERIENCES FROM THREE DECADES

Joyce Marie Mushaben
University of Missouri-St. Louis

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ABSTRACT

This essay explores the evolution of the West German peace movement, in an effort to assess the degree of continuity perceived to exist between protests of the fifties and sixties and those of the seventies and eighties. It examines the notion of "protest cycles," with an emphasis on the inherently dynamic character of social movements. The author moreover considers the extent to which multiple protest issues have begun to converge over three decades, producing an anti-nuclear groundswell for which the German "Green" and "Alternative" Parties have become a political clearing house of sorts. The author holds that a peace movement of the magnitude now witnessed in the Federal Republic cannot be divorced from the larger questions of national identity, political legitimacy and the socialization of German youth. The experiences of three decades are significant in that their cumulative effects have introduced a new concept of participation and may well contribute to a new chapter on German-German relations.

Optimismus heisst: Glauben, dass

der nächste Krieg noch nicht der letzte ist.

-- Lutz Rathenow

Massive peace protests are occurring throughout Western Europe, the likes of which have not been witnessed since the late 1960's. Since the early 1970's, the chances of an exacerbation of political tensions resulting in a direct military confrontation between the two Germanies have declined dramatically. The likelihood that the German Federal Republic (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) might one day serve as the center stage for a major military showdown between the superpowers nonetheless persists. Willy Brandt's successful initiation of Ostpolitik, 1970-72, brought about a partial mitigation of East-West tensions, which contributed to a sense of domestic stability in both of the newly declared sovereign German states. By the late 1970's, however, the proliferation of tactical nuclear weapons in the European theater reawakened fears that the two German zones could one day become a nuclear "ground zero" for reasons unrelated to their specific security needs. This growing sense of existential Angst is a primary, but not the sole driving force behind current European protest movements.

In surveying the growing wave of anti-nuclear protests, one might be tempted to assume that many of the same activists, the old vanguard of the late sixties and early seventies, have reemerged from their ideological closets with the intention of mobilizing a "successor generation" around the same old socio-political controversies. Both the scale and the scope of protest movements which have so charged the European political climate in recent months nonetheless attest to the fact that spirits behind the outbursts of social unrest bear little resemblance to the "spectres haunting" of earlier years. In contrast to the ideological purists of old,

present-day protesters constitute a rather motley crew, inclined to form bizarre coalitions around a complex of disparate issues, goals and occasionally contradictory political strategies. While ostensibly rooted in an ongoing crisis of superpower relations, the race to deploy ever more sophisticated weapons in Central Europe has begun to take its toll on the balance of socio-political forces, particularly within the two Germanies. The significance of the cyclical nature and the commensurate growth of national peace movements in the FRG and and GDR may well rest in their effects on the concept of participation and in their contributions to a new chapter on German-German relations.

This essay seeks to assess the degree of continuity presumed to exist between the West German dissident movements of the fifties and sixties, and the protests of the seventies and eighties. Part One explores the concept of protest cycles, with an emphasis on the inherently dynamic character of social protest movements. Part Two traces the evolution of peace protests rooted in the anti-rearmament and anti-nuclear campaigns of the late fifties and sixties, with special emphasis on the role of the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church in the FRG. Part Three explores the extent to which multiple protest issues have begun to converge over three decades, producing an anti-nuclear groundswell for which the Green/Alternative Parties have become something of a political clearing house. The final section considers a few of the cumulative effects of three decades of peace protest and addresses what may well be the Gretchenfrage of postwar European history: the question of German national identity. The author contends that a peace movement of the magnitude now witnessed in the Federal Republic cannot be divorced from broader questions of political legitimacy and the socialization of German youth.

I. Cycles of Protest and Societal Dynamics

Protest movements are primarily reactive in nature, and hence cannot be divorced from the socio-economic environment in which they unfold. Nor can one assume that opposition movements are fated to develop in isolation with respect to each other. Even in those cases where protesters may fail to achieve specific movement objectives, there exists the possibility that they will effect less easily discernable changes in the "political opportunity structure" over time. Cycles of opposition to specific state policies become the "crucibles out of which new weapons of social protest are fashioned" (Tarrow, 1982).

The integration and assimilation of certain protest "experiences" can lead participants themselves to develop a sense of the evolutionary character of their movements. This evolutionary dimension is highlighted by Rammstedt's designation of a social movement as a social process, whose dynamic unfolds in a situational context (Rammstedt, 1978). Pursuant to this dynamic,

> protest groups emerge as a result of structural changes in a society, and as a movement develops its organization, ideologies, and tactics adapt to the environmental and political circumstances in which it evolves. In the course of broadening its constituency and developing its strategies, a social movement also becomes a source of further structural change, though often in directions that may be neither anticipated nor intended (Neikin and Pollak, 1981:6).

Charles Tilly's analysis centering on the role of collective violence in Western European political development suggests the existence of a "standard cycle" that leads to a fusion of social protest and structural change. Historically, it appears that

> a relatively integrated traditional society breaks up under the stress and movement of industrialization, the

> stress and movement stimulate a wide variety of violent reactions -- at first chaotic, but gradually acquiring a measure of coherence. New means of control and ways of reintegrating the displaced segments of the population into an orderly social life eventually develop, and finally a mature industrial society held together by widespread, generally pacific political participation emerges. In such a theory, the stimulus to collective violence comes largely from the anxieties people experience when established institutions fall apart (Tilly, 1979: 87).

Nothing in Tilly's analysis precludes the possibility that the transition from industrial to post-industrial society will evoke similar stresses and movements. Just as German experiences with inflation and unemployment during the interwar period resulted in the disestablishment of Weimar, current anxieties over structural unemployment and energy-related inflation have raised national anxiety to unprecedented postwar levels. Moreover, for many protesters, there is the threat that when the established institutions do fall apart, they will be likely to take the whole world with them, i.e. in the event of a nuclear holocaust.

Whether or not West German peace protesters have adapted their tactics, altered their ideologies, expanded their constituencies and served as a force for structural change across three decades: these are the questions examined in the sections below.

A. THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1945-1970

A rapidly expanding movement aimed at preventing the 1983 deployment of additional theater nuclear forces (TNF) in West Germany has its roots in a thirty year old tradition of peace protest. As early as 1950, the Lutheran Church (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland = EKD) expressed its opposition to any and all plans for rearming the Federal Republic, which religious leaders feared would ultimately result in the permanent division of Germany.

The experiences under National Socialism, and perhaps a sense of Mitverantwortung (co-responsibility) in the absence of a church-wide resistance movement during the thirties and forties, led the Evangelical community to break temporarily with traditional precepts of war theology, i.e. the concept of a "just war." The Church did an about-face in 1952, however, maintaining that the question of German rearmament and the question of peace were not identical (Pestalozzi, 1982).

Initial discussion of plans to rearm Germany drew sporadic expressions of protest, beginning in 1952, from pacifist factions within the protestant churches, as well as within the German Trade Union Federation (DGB). Early organizational efforts culminated in a demonstration of 1000 at the St. Paul's Church in Frankfurt on January 29, 1955, in opposition to the Paris Agreements granting the Federal Republic new status as a full partner to NATO. Legislation promulgated by the Bundestag provided for voluntary military service in 1955, approved the production of war materials, and subsequently jettisoned voluntary service in favor of universal conscription in 1956 (Graf, 1976).

By 1957 opposition to the remilitarization of German society had waned to the point that the Lutheran Church even agreed to conduct secret negotiations with the Bonn government, the outcome of which was a contract obliging the Church to attend to the spiritual needs of military recruits (Klatt, 1982). The year 1957 nonetheless commenced with another round of intense, church-internal discussions on the moral dimensions of rearmament. Debate ensued when in February, 1957, the first Atomic Minister and subsequent Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss announced his intention to consider West German adoption of American-supplied "tactical" nuclear weapons -- some of which, it was revealed in March, had already been

deployed (Graf, 1976: 177).

In April, a group of prominent scientists, including three Nobel Prize winners, issued a public appeal, the Göttingen Manifesto, which served as a rallying point for those fundamentally opposed to atomic weapons, especially for Germany. Other scholars joined in the protest, as did a newly founded German Peace Society and the Union of Persons Persecuted by the Nazi Regime. Opposition was quasi-institutionalized by way of the "Fight Atomic Death" campaign that gained momentum in 1957-58, paralleled by the growth of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Great Britain (Duff, 1971).

It is at least striking, if not "a lasting indictment of the 'official' Left that it failed to assume the initiative in the anti-nuclear arms campaign" during the late 1950's (Graf, 1976: 178). The SPD offered support of the bandwagon variety, more intent on cultivating an image of respectability in preparation for the 1957 elections than on playing out its role as formal Opposition. Labor attempted to maintain a stance of party-political neutrality, until it was overtaken by reports of astonishingly broad-based support for the anti-nuclear drive. A March 1958 poll revealed that 83 percent of a representative sample, including a majority of CDU/CSU voters, rejected Bonn's rearmament plans, and 52 percent would support a call for a general strike as a form of protest (Rupp, 1970: 167). Having lost a critical Bundestag vote in March, nuclear opponents resorted to a strategy of extraparliamentary mobilization, i.e. silent marches attracting several hundred thousands, work stoppages, church appeals and 1500 May Day demonstrations. Electoral problems at the Lander level led the SPD to water down its anti-armament commitment even more. The strongest trade unions followed suit, realizing that a campaign without formal party backing was doomed (Helm, 1979). A Federal Constitutional Court verdict

proscribing three Lander plebiscites on the nuclear issue as unconstitutional caused the "Fight Atomic Death" movement to run aground shortly thereafter.

A number of religious-pacifist groups continued their push for a formal church "No to Nuclear Weapons." Enjoying nominal EKD support, a new group called "Action Reconciliation/Peace Services" emerged in 1958 with an emphasis on voluntarism and interest in Third World problems, but its focus quickly turned to peace. A growing division among the ecclesiastical ranks found expression in the Heidelberg Theses issued in 1959, outlining two essentially contradictory principles:

> Thesis 7: The Church must recognize the renunciation of arms as a Christian course of action.
> Thesis 8: The Church must recognize participation in the attempt to secure peace in freedom through the presence of atomic weapons as a course of action that is <u>still</u> possible for Christians <u>today</u> (Klatt, 1982: 22).

The words "still" and "today" kept alive hopes that the EKD would reevaluate its position, until 1967 when the annual synod in Hannover substituted the "static" formula: "Peace Service with and without weapons" (Klatt, 1982: 22). The position of the Catholic Church, bearing the imprint of doctrinaire anti-communism, was much less ambivalent (Zeller, 1982).

The early 1960's were relatively quiescent, the major exceptions being the progressively more successful Easter March appeals, modeled after the British CND's efforts to take the peace message to the countryside, literally. The number of participants rose from 1,000 in 1960, to 100,000 in 1964, to 150,000 in 1967 (Graf, 1976: 257). The function of the Easter March Movement changed with the times. Operating at first as a forum for protests of conscience on behalf of a vaguely defined "peace" issue, it became a vehicle for collecting information and opposing specific security issues,

thereby expanding its organizational base. The mobilizational capacity of the Marches was tactically reinforced by the student movement and substantively redirected by the West German parliament's deliberations on Emergency Powers Legislation in May, 1968.

Under mounting pressure from the SDS, the issue focus was broadened, as anti-emergency legislation groups joined others in opposing Bonn's support for the Iranian Shah and for American involvement in Viet Nam. The expansion of the protest agenda was reflected in a name change for the Easter Movement, known as the Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament after January, 1968. An assassination attempt against Rudi Dutschke on Holy Thursday, 1968, produced the largest march turnout ever, with subsequent demonstrations doubling as an anti-Springer campaign (against the very conservative, often sensationalistic newspaper monopoly). The proliferation of causes, growing factionalization among the Left, an increasing proclivity for violent forms of direct action -- these factors contributed to the deterioration of the movement, its demise coinciding with the eventual promulgation of the emergency provisions (made possible by SPD acquiescence).

The protests directed against NATO's plans to equip the West German military with "the most modern weapons available" in the late 1950's were politically significant in three respects. First and foremost, the decision to rearm the FRG in general and to deploy atomic weapons in particular represented a dramatic reversal of Western Occupational policy. Plans for rearmament "from above" -- whether or not they were construed as a response to heightened Cold War tensions -- testified to a change in Allied perceptions regarding the value of policies designed to de-nazify and democratize, much less to demilitarize the former Reich. Chancellor

Adenauer's determined backing of NATO plans signified the beginning of a qualitatively different German-American relationship. Having identified for ten years with the respective roles of the-subjugated-and-the-conquerer, the two states would subsequently relate to each other as partner-and-protector.

Secondly, the late fifties campaign marked the end of an era of unprecedented domestic consensus with respect to foreign policy (which is not to underestimate the significance of the SPD's attempts to block the currency reform and early waves of "fundamental opposition" to rearmament, 1950-1954). Prior consensus regarding the need to accept collective sacrifices as a vehicle for expediting economic reconstruction had been virtually unanimous. After 1958, it was West German foreign and defense policy that served as a major stimulant to an ongoing nation-wide debate, ideological polarization and outright protest, in part because a measure of economic security left more time for the consideration of new and controversial issues (Baker, Dalton Hildebrandt, 1981).

Finally, the "Fight Atomic Death" movement appears, in retrospect, to have been structurally significant for the polity as a whole. When activists realized in January, 1958, that protests articulated by means of parliamentary debates, referenda, petitions and public surveys were ineffective in compelling a response from Adenauer, they resorted to a strategy of extraparliamentary opposition. In shifting to these unconventional forms of participation, they set a precedent for a second wave of protesters who adopted similar tactics during the late 1960's. Boycotts, teach-ins, etc. became the trademark of a quasi-organized Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO), following the expulsion of SDS activists from the SPD. APO was even more effective than the Atomic Death Campaign had been in mobilizing major segments of the university population

and radical trade union elements, once dissenters realized that their ability to command much policy influence through normal participatory channels was limited by the peculiar political constraints of the Grand Coalition, 1966-1969 (Fichter and Lönnendonker, 1977).

Brandt's successful electoral bid in 1969, based on a promise to "dare more democracy," enabled opposition groups to pursue a dual strategy. APO continued to employ unconventional tactics, i.e. in opposition to the Viet Nam War, but these measures were complemented by plans for a "Long March" through the institutions, orchestrated by reformists who believed that the Social Democrats would dramatically alter the course of socio-economic development in the FRG. Chancellor Brandt's vigorous search for a viable Ostpolitik and his interest in a peaceful settlement of the Oder-Neisse conflict reinforced hopes that reform-from-within was indeed possible, thus depriving many marchers of their key issue. Reactions to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia created serious rifts among communist organizers, and the revolutionary brouhaha of the SDS was increasingly criticized for detracting from the earnestness of the pacifist movement. Had Viet Nam not provided a common cause, the APO movement would have collapsed completely by 1970, as a single movement, its days were nevertheless numbered.

III. THE "SUCCESSOR GENERATION" IN THE 1970's AND 1980's

The level of mobilization among leftists was still quite high when the Viet Nam War came to a rather abrupt end in 1972, ideological fragmentation notwithstanding. The Bonn government was caught off guard when large numbers of critical, politicized, newly enfranchised citizens suddenly shifted their protest focus and redirected their organizational energies against nuclear energy and environmental hazards. The economic shock waves generated by the

OPEC oil embargo of 1973 left the social-liberal coalition with few immediate alternatives to the development of idigenous nuclear energy capabilities, despite increasing opposition. The post-embargo recession brought other reform programs, such as university expansion, to a dramatic halt.

The period 1972-1977 witnessed a transfer of protest momentum from one social movement to another, as experienced pacifists and blooming ecologists found common cause in the threat of environmental destruction. A proliferation of protest initiatives at the local and regional levels led to an emphasis on a presumed, logical connection between the dangers inherent to the civilian and the military uses of nuclear technology (Eppler, 1981; Jungk, 1977). In contrast, the leftist and pacifist groups of the sixties had been inclined to support atomic research for civilian purposes ("Atoms for Peace"), but to reject outright nuclear development for use by the military (Otto, 1977). While both the German and the British trade union federations could be expected to join forces with the anti-atomic marchers in the fifties and sixties, the spectre of mass unemployment frightened many individual unions instead into forging coalitions with pro-nuclear elements, particularly after 1973. (Helm, 1982; Duff, 1971).

Campaigns against US imperialism and assaults on creeping "consumer terrorism" may have been morally uplifting for the protesters of the sixties, but in retrospect they were not nearly as effective as the Anti-Nuclear Energy Movement (AKK) has been in mobilizing the Herr and Frau Müllers of the Silent Majority. One of the most valuable lessons gleaned from the site occupations at Wyhl and Brokdorf rests with the fact that smaller, locally based groups were able to mobilize more demonstrators, faster. Organizers learned that a decentralization of protest activities

generated alternative sources of information and moreover served as an antidote to bureaucratic alienation and disillusionment with the SPD at the national level. The first "citizen initiative" groups born of the late sixties were viewed at the time as political action committees appended to the SPD, whose activism in the environmental field was expected to complement party platform efforts. Since the mid seventies, however, the Bürgerinitiativen (BI) have become an autonomous political force; indeed they now lay claim to the title "reincarnated extraparliamentary opposition" in their dealings with the established party system (Huber, 1981; Offe, 1974; Helm, 1979).

There are now an estimated 38,000 BI's in the Federal Republic, backed by at least 15 million sympathizers (Huber, 1981). Membership figures outstrip those of the established parties, and the model has been emulated by citizens throughout Western Europe (Berger, 1979; Helm, 1979). Over the last ten years, citizen activists have gradually developed a more systematic political critique directed against unrestricted economic growth and technological destruction of the environment -- a theme shared with the born-again peace movement (Huber, 198). Membership profiles indicate that many former activists from the APO/Long March generation have found a second home in the BI's. Participants share upper middle class backgrounds, are highly educated, critically informed and self-confident with respect to their own political-organizational skills. The Bürgerinitiativen have provided very fertile ground for the seeds of a new anti-nuclear weapons movement.

The wide-scale deployment of Soviet SS-20's carried out in 1977-78 induced Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to push for a US response to the Warsaw Pact buildup. The outcome of discussions based on perceptions of Soviet

nuclear superiority in the European theater was the NATO "two-track" decision of December 12, 1979, which foresaw a modernization of NATO nuclear capabilities through deployment of 572 new Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles (see Appendix A). But the agreement simultaneously obliged NATO members, in particular the US, to pursue serious arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union in the hopes of rendering the deployments unnecessary (Kaldor and Smith, 1982; Thompson, 1982).

No longer a NATO weakling, the Federal Republic has come to occupy a pivotal position among the European peace movements. The long-standing Cold War question, "What will we do when the Russians come?" has been subject to reformulation since 1978: "What will we do if the Americans stay?" In comparison to the peace mobilization efforts of two decades ago, the latest campaign is characterized by significantly less ideological purity. A strong religious component and a strong secular-"alternative" component enjoy pre-eminent influence in what has loosely been labeled "the movement," which has hit the FRG in two waves. The first surge of protest flowed rather unexpectedly out of the 19th annual Congress of the German Evangelical (Lutheran) Church, which drew 150,000 participant observers to Hamburg in June, 1981; it peaked with a non-violent demonstration of 300,000 in Bonn on October 10, 1981. The second wave was unleashed by Reagan's statements in late October, 1981 on the topic of a conceivably winnable, limited nuclear war. This secular impetus swelled the protest ranks even more, culminating in the anti-Reagan demonstrations of June 10, 1982 held in Bonn and Berlin. Organizational efforts are continuing on both the religious and secular fronts, often overlapping. Indeed, one must be careful not to adhere too rigidly to a particular organizational classification or ideological delineation of groups, given the highly decentralized nature of the movement

as a whole.

The Evangelical Church's ambivalent stance with respect to the morality of nuclear warfare, as manifested in the 1959 Heidelberg Theses, resurfaced in the 1970's. A group of "radical-pacifist" church members founded a peace initiative in 1978, "Live Without Armaments," whose adherents now number over 150,000. A countergroup emerged within the Church in 1980, calling itself "Secure the Peace." Religious activists opposing the arms race derived inspiration from a Dutch initiative organized in 1977 by the InterChurch Peace Council (IKV) under the motto, "rid the earth of weapons, begin with the Netherlands" (Delle, 1981). The EKD-affiliated Action Reconciliation/Peace Services (AS/F) joined the IKV in sponsoring the first FRG-wide peace week in November, 1980, introducing the theme Frieden Schaffen Ohne Waffen -- Create Peace Without Weapons.

Manifold actions followed. A meeting of NATO officials in Bonn drew 25,000 demonstrators in April, 1981, a student rally in May brought together 40,000 for "Bafög [student loans and grants], not bombs." Another 20,000 staged a Peace March Against Atomic Weapons in Frankfurt, also in May, and 30 organizations sponsored a joint peace forum in Marburg. Hannover hosted a demonstration in support of the "Krefeld Appeal," a petition signed by two million people to date, calling for a European referendum on disarmament (see Appendix B). By the time the 19th Lutheran Congress (Kirchentag) convened on June 17, its theme "Fear Not" had attracted 300 peace groups, 65 specifically religious initiatives and many unexpected guests who imposed their own theme, "Have Fear -- Atomic Death Threatens Us All" (Der Spiegel, 22. June 1981). Top SPD officials became the target of reproach, understandable in light of Chancellor Schmidt's comment made one month earlier: "The sermon on the mount [blessed are the peacemakers] offers no

practical guidelines for modern day politicians . . . That's not what it was intended for" (Der Spiegel, 8. June 1981). The AS/F, which assumed primary responsibility for organizing the massive Bonn demonstration the following October, benefited greatly from the momentum generated by the Kirchentag. The 1000+ groups represented in Bonn hoped their event would serve as a stimulant to greater grass roots involvement (Deile, 1981).

Whether or not the EKD leadership intended to do anything more than provide a forum for discussion, the large turnout and extensive media coverage led many to interpret the Hamburg Congress as a de facto endorsement of the movement by the Church. One noticeable outcome has been a rapid increase in the number of young German males filing for conscientious objector status. Dating from the promulgation of the Law of Military Obligation in 1956, C.O. applications tallied about 3000 a year through the 1960's (this excludes any male residing in Berlin, who is automatically exempt from the 18 months of mandatory service by virtue of the city's unique Four-Power military status). A 1977 liberalization of the draft law had produced such a flood of applications -- 40,000 between August and December, including 6,000 from soldiers -- that the CDU/CSU filed suit in the Federal Constitutional Court and won its case, obligating the SPD-FDP coalition to reimpose tighter "test standards." Nevertheless, the number of draft resisters in 1981 rose to 50-60,000, including 5,454 soldiers. Approximately 30-40,000 men between 18-25 annually pursue the alternative service option, i.e. working in nursing homes, mental institutions, etc. (Lange, 1982: 126-27, 131). The term for "civilian service" has recently been extended from 16 to 20 months (Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 March 1983).

The Hamburg Congress moreover assisted organizers in bringing the peace movement to the more conservative provinces. The next 12 months witnessed

several hundred "peace weeks" and workshops on nonviolent action being planned and executed at the local level, many in conjunction with individual parishes. Hans Pestalozzi reports that by 1982 there were over 2,300 local, national and international initiatives and institutions serving European peace activists. The Social Democrats were sufficiently sobered by their Hamburg experience that the party conducted its own Peace Forum in Bonn on August 27, 1981, inviting such prominent dissidents as Rudolf Bahro and General Gert Bastian (Apel et al, 1981). The Easter March was reinstituted in April 1982 drawing 150,000 nationwide, turning out 30-40,000 in Frankfurt, and 160-380 in small towns like Sachsenhausen and Michelstadt im Odenwald (Die Zeit, 23. April 1982). The most recent Evangelical Kirchentag drew a reported 200,000 participants to Hannover in June, 1983, transforming the synod from "a sedentary gathering of church elders into a youth-dominated mass event" (The Christian Science Monitor, June 10, 1983). Described by members of the political establishment as "an anti-nuclear peace festival," the synod adopted a theme which would now appear to locate the Lutheran church among the ranks of the radical opposition. The motto -- "Return to Life. Now is the time for an uncompromising 'No' to mass destruction weapons" -- is a call for citizen action, if not for unilateral disarmament, extending well beyond the psychological dimensions of the 1981 "Fear Not" theme.

In recent years the movement has derived further moral support from parallel demonstrations in neighboring countries: 400,000 in Amsterdam in November, 50,000 in Bern in December, 1981; 200,000 in Paris and nearly 500,000 in New York in June, 1982. For the most part, organizers have stressed their contacts with protest groups in the US as evidence that the campaigns are not an exercise in anti-Americanism. The notion that this is a

movement "made in Moscow" is undermined by the degree of church support it attracts -- ironically, arrangements for the anti-Reagan demonstrations of June, 1982 fell to the Evangelical Student Community (EVG), according to a rotation system worked out by the leaders of various groups. Efforts by the West German Communist Party to put its stamp on the movement have been quickly dismissed by other groups (Die Zeit, 29 October 1982). The Soviets have come in for their share of criticism as well: demonstrators turned out full force in honor of Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in November, 1981, attesting to the fact that both superpowers are held culpable for their role in promoting a nuclear arms race.

Maintaining a rather anomalous position in a crowded field of peace organizers is the West German Catholic Church. A group of the "devout left" tried to mobilize participants at the 1968 Essener Congress, with no noticeable effect. At present the most active faction by far has been the Catholic Youth Organization, boasting 650,000 members who have adopted "Peace and Justice" as their key theme for the next three years. The German branch of the international Pax Christi cannot hold the proverbial candle to Action Reconciliation in terms of active cooperation with other peace groups. But it does appear that "the last major social bastion has finally been infected with the peace movement virus" (Die Zeit, 17. September 1982). The 87th Catholic Congress assembled in Düsseldorf in September, 1982 under the rubric "Turn Around - Disarm Yourself." Challenged by the contents of the pastoral letter debated by American Catholic bishops over the last two years, German ecclesiastics are recognizing a need to "add the moral rigor of Catholicism to the pragmatism of Protestantism" (Die Zeit, 17. September 1982).

Protest mathematics have dictated a lowest common denominator strategy

for determining peace movement goals in the FRG: the sole shared objective is to prevent the 1983 deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, as required by the NATO Double Decision. The common conviction is that additional theater nuclear forces will render the Federal Republic the "ground zero" of a superpower confrontation. The tactical questions are unresolved. Contradictory opinions are voiced with respect to the desirability of unilaterial or multilateral disarmament agreements. The definition of parity and the logical limits of deterrence are open to debate. Activists are divided over whether or not to demand simultaneous reductions in the Eastern bloc, and uncertain how to deal with nuclear proliferation in the Third World. No clear answer emerges to the question whether or not a build-up of conventional forces offers a morally or politically acceptable alternative. One discerns no single position with respect to the feasibility of a nuclear-free zone, prospects for alternative defense concepts or the inevitability of a political-bloc concept of security. Organizers have therefore made a conscious effort to avoid mobilizing around a single political party, which could put an end to its mass (if messy) base. Party political stances <u>within</u> the disarmament movement are still too preponderant (Pestalozzi, 1982: p. 95).

As explicitly political representatives of the peace movement, the Green and Alternative parties have made impressive electoral gains over the last three years. Alternative parties moreover enjoy substantial support among otherwise apolitical youth, i.e. members of the New Wave and squatters' scenes. The 1981 Shell study reveals that among 15-24 year olds, following the 32 percent who identify with no party, 20 percent back the Greens (Jugendwerk, 1981). However, even with 27 seats in the Bundestag as of March, 1983, "the Greens" remain a very loose confederation of

pro-ecology, anti-nuclear, grass-roots democrats who lack a coherent ideological base. The Greens comprise the Long March arm of the peace movement, whose self-proclaimed responsibility lies in furthering the prospects of success for extraparliamentary opposition to the 1983 deployments (Mettke, 1982). One occasionally senses, however, that the Greens may be developing a hidden agenda relating not only to a denuclearization of the FRG, but to the promotion of peace between the two Germanies. I will return to this possibility in the concluding portion of the paper.

IV. NEUTRO-NATIONALISM "MADE IN GERMANY"

For the two German states, the special political significance of the peace movements must be ascribed to the security dilemma presented by their respective geostrategic locations. The security policies of both countries are strictly delimited by their mutual dependence on another major power. This dependence has become a critical element in the self-image of these states and has significantly influenced their definitions of power with respect to foreign policy.

Article 5 of the 1972 Basic Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) commits the FRG and the GDR to a search for measures to bring about arms reductions in Europe and a mutual support of efforts to place the remainder under effective international control. Yet neither side has seen fit to exploit opportunities made possible by a general improvement in German-German relations, for the purpose of establishing "confidence-building" measures. Instead, "many West German policy makers... have gladly used international complications surrounding the German question as a way of reducing their responsibility for (irrational) relations with the other German state,"

according to former FRG representative to the GDR, Günter Gaus, (Die Zeit, 4 June 1982). The converse no doubt holds true for the East German leadership. (Cramer, 1978; Bruns, 1979, 1982).

But the more strained the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union becomes, the greater the inclination among some disarmament proponents to move the question of inter-German relations to the center stage. It would be overstating the case to argue for all demonstrators that "In light of world political developments over the last two years, the German question has permeated our consciousness as the key to European peace" (Ammon and Brandt, 1982: 321). A unique meeting of the minds in East Berlin during December of 1981, on the one-hand, and a bevy of media reports on neutro-nationalism, national-neutralism, crypto-nationalism and "German patriotism," on the other, indicate a significant degree of interest in the topic on both sides of the border nonetheless.

Some 100 writers, artists and scholars from East and West attended an SED-sanctioned conference at the "Hotel Stadt Berlin" on December 13-14, 1981, at the same time Schmidt and Honecker were engaged in a summit meeting at Wehrbellin (both disrupted by the imposition of martial law in Poland). The December Berliner Begegnung does not represent the first call for an intensified German-German dialogue to have grown out of the peace movement. Nor, fittingly, has it been the first appeal to come from Berlin. What is more surprising, however, is the fact that the subject of German nationalism is generating a lot of positive interest among the political left. One would expect to hear praise for "German patriotism" coming from Otto von Bismarck, but not from Heinrich Böll. In fact, West Berlin's Alternative List Party has devoted some time and platform space to the Deutschlandfrage ever since its 1981 electoral campaign.

Always prepared to rush in where more celestial powers prefer not to tread, the Alternative List (AL) has issued a four-point challenge to a Germany which has accepted its division as the status quo. Militarily, the AL ardently supports the creation of a German nuclear-free zone, the withdrawal of all but a symbolic contingent of occupational forces from both Berlins, termination of FRG and GDR membership in the NATO and Warsaw Pacts, respectively. Politically, the Alternatives advocate a loose confederation of the two German states, which would allow for cooperation in the fields of economics, environmental protection, transportation, urban development, science, culture, sports and Third World assistance. They also press for a liberalization of travel rights for East Germans. On the economic front, the AL has proposed an extension of the "special ties" concept (outlined in the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971) to permit the inclusion of the GDR in GATT, to establish the convertability of the East German Mark and to promote West Berlin's integration into the East German economy. With respect to legal status, the Alternatives want to see a formal peace treaty along the lines of the Austrian model and the elimination of a priori prohibitions on reunification talks. The reunification the "neutro-nationalists" have in mind, however, "would not resemble the centralized Prussian-national state of Bismarck. . . It would be neither a camouflaged FRG nor an overextended GDR" (Die Zeit, 20 November 1981). The object is to substitute a new Heimat-Gefühl for a thirty year old "hostage" consciousness. The system parties find this proposal to "open old wounds" very unsettling.

At this point, German reunification is a highly unlikely proposition. Perhaps the disarmament movement arouses memories of the anti-rearmament days when reunification was a dream kept very much alive by Adenauer's conservative government. One may wish to discount the reunification

proposals as little more than an exercise in radical-romanticism. The question of German national identity, however, can not be so quickly dismissed.

In youth circles, there is a growing feeling of alienation towards the system which finds its parallels in the GDR. Politicians and psychologists on both sides of the border are witnessing the development of a "second culture," a pattern of "internal emigration" based on a rejection of establishment values, whether they be capitalist or socialist (Mushaben, 1983; Mieczkowski, 1983). The large numbers of adolescents flocking to ecclesiastical synods do not necessarily signify that a major religious revival is in the making. Rather, it is the Church's century-old tradition of providing sanctuary that has attracted so many displaced flower-children. They see the church as a place where they are free to ask questions and where they can find a sense of belonging among others who share their fears.

I would like to suggest that the two German states are only now confronting the full-fledged political effects connected with the missing generation phenomenon. Demographic polarization in the FRG and the GDR has been a major factor in youth's strong attraction to the peace movement in both systems. First of all, a majority of the peace activists are too young to have experienced fascism directly; they are tired of the national guilt complex imposed on them for atrocities they never committed. They have witnessed a different kind of destruction of the environment in their own lifetime, however, whose costs they shall also have to pay: Hence, the connection between the two anti-nuclear movements.

Second, a German baby-boom delayed by the imperatives of reconstruction has reached employable age, just as worsening economic conditions dictate dramatic cutbacks in educational and career opportunities, construction of

housing and recreational facilities, and other services important to youth -- in the East as well as in the West. Arms expenditures have become a significant source of resentment towards the system and towards the superpowers who stand behind them.

Finally, for many of the 1980's protesters a world divided into ideological spheres of influence is an historical given, and not a particularly useful one at that. They have on occasion sought to channel their demands through the established institutions, for which they have been rebuffed, vilified, black-listed (Berufsverbot) and even imprisoned. Anti-nuclear protesters have attempted to add important items to the political agenda. They have found greater personal satisfaction and a sense of community in grass-roots involvement. Neither governments in the West nor East have lived up to their respective promises to "dare more democracy" and to provide for "each according to his or her need."

For these reasons, the peace movements in the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic have become an important vehicle for political expression. Their significance will not be measurable in terms of how many Pershing II and cruise missiles are actually deployed beginning in the fall of 1983. The hundreds of thousands, if not millions of citizens who have been mobilized in opposition to the nuclear arms race are unlikely to settle for a peace defined as "no war" -- or for a post-industrial democracy based on restricted opportunities for participation in relation to critical environmental decisions.

With respect to the cumulative effects of three decades of peace protest in West Germany, I would argue that there have been significant overlaps between cycles past and present. Nevertheless, the unifying factor among the movements is no longer an overarching ideology, but rather the

substantive connections that participants are discovering as each movement evolves. Each evolution has contributed to a convergence of protest foci, and hence to an expansion of the protest agenda. Two elements appear to permeate the European protests of the eighties. First, germane to all is a perceived need for an opposition to fundamental premises dominating the respective socio-economic establishments, extending well beyond a critique of any single policy or issue. Secondly, the fusion of opposition movements is grounded in common political learning experiences, positive and negative, which have subsequently been adapted to suit a wide variety of protest needs. Organizationally successful occupations of nuclear energy sites at Wyhl, Brokdorf and Kaiseraugst, for example, have raised public consciousness and have even contributed to discussions of possible missile site occupations among the more militant anti-armament factions (according to multiple interviews conducted by this author during the summer of 1982).

The expansion of the protest agenda poses new organizational challenges to movement activists; I would like to suggest that this expansion is causally related to the institutionalization of dissent, embodied in the German "Greens" and Alternative Parties. Further, the relationship appears to be a reciprocal one - institutionalization leads to a further expansion of the protest agenda, as partial reforms trigger new expectations and as "learning experiences" (i.e. with non-violence tactics) are shared among formerly disparate groups. Finally, I would advance the proposition that the cumulative impact of an institutionalized peace movement could mean an increase in the probability that mobilized protest will induce changes in the "political opportunity structure" as the system parties are forced to incorporate these concerns into their own political agendas. The reasons for incorporating items from the protest agenda will be twofold. First, they

will need to match the appeals of new formal competitors for political office in the short run. Secondly, (establishment parties) will be forced to recognize the significance of these issues in the long run, in their efforts to win back the proverbial "hearts and minds" of an entire generation of alienated, apolitical youth, speaking the visceral language of Angst.

APPENDIX A

25A

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Communiques Brussels, December 12, 13, 14, 1979

SPECIAL COMMUNIQUE, THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DECEMBER 12, 1979

1. At a special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on 12th December 1979:

2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.

3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programs modernizing and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theatre rôle. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively, Western LRTNF capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter-range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet inter-continental capabilities and achievement of parity in inter-continental capability with the United States.

5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in inter-continental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive consideration, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing US Pershing I-A, and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads.

All the nations currently participating in the integrated defense structure will participate in the program: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The program will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, Ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of rôles and systems in NATO's nuclear armory as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the rôle of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of détente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and détente in the 1980s. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes towards achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems. This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and US systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.

B. Limitations on US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on US and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

25C

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defence Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms control negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defense and thus maintain the security of its member States.

A. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defense needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defense and détente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

APPENDIX B
25 D

Der Appell von Krefeld: Keine Atomraketen in Europa

Immer offensichtlicher erweist sich der Nachrüstungsbeschluß der NATO vom 12. Dezember 1979 als verhängnisvolle Fehlentscheidung. Die Erwartung, wonach Vereinbarungen zwischen den USA und der Sowjetunion zur Begrenzung der eurostrategischen Waffensysteme noch vor der Stationierung einer neuen Generation amerikanischer nuklearer Mittelstreckenwaffen in Westeuropa erreicht werden könnten, scheint sich nicht zu erfüllen.
Ein Jahr nach Brüssel ist noch nicht einmal der Beginn solcher Verhandlungen in Sicht. Im Gegenteil: Der neugewählte Präsident der USA erklärt unumwunden, selbst den bereits unterzeichneten SALT II-Vertrag zur Begrenzung der sowjetischen und amerikanischen strategischen Nuklearwaffen nicht akzeptieren und deshalb dem Senat nicht zur Ratifizierung zuleiten zu wollen.
Mit der Verweigerung dieser Ratifizierung durch die USA würde jedoch die Aussicht auf Verhandlungen zur Begrenzung der eurostrategischen Nuklearwaffen unvermeidbar in noch weitere Ferne rücken. Ein selbstmörderischer Rüstungswettlauf könnte nicht im letzten Augenblick gestoppt werden; seine zunehmende Beschleunigung und offenbar konkreter werdende Vorstellungen von der scheinbaren Begrenzbarkeit eines Nuklearkrieges müßten in erster Linie die europäischen Völker einem untragbaren Risiko aussetzen.
Die Teilnehmer am Krefelder Gespräch vom 15. und 16. November 1980 appellieren daher gemeinsam an die Bundesregierung,

- die Zustimmung zur Stationierung von Pershing-II-Raketen und Marschflugkörpern in Mitteleuropa zurückzuziehen;
- im Bündnis künftig eine Haltung einzunehmen, die unser Land nicht länger dem Verdacht aussetzt, Wegbereiter eines neuen, vor allem die Europäer gefährdenden nuklearen Wettrüstens sein zu wollen.

In der Öffentlichkeit wächst die Sorge über die jüngste Entwicklung. Immer entschiedener werden die Möglichkeiten einer alternativen Sicherheitspolitik diskutiert.
Solche Überlegungen sind von großer Bedeutung für den demokratischen Prozeß der Willensbildung und können dazu beitragen, daß unser Volk sich nicht plötzlich vollzogenen Tatsachen gegenübergestellt sieht.
Alle Mitbürgerinnen und Mitbürger werden deshalb aufgerufen, diesen Appell zu unterstützen, um durch unablässigen und wachsenden Druck der öffentlichen Meinung eine Sicherheitspolitik zu erzwingen, die

- eine Aufrüstung Mitteleuropas zur nuklearen Waffenplattform der USA nicht zuläßt;
- Abrüstung für wichtiger hält als Abschreckung;
- die Entwicklung der Bundeswehr an dieser Zielsetzung orientiert.

Erstunterzeichner: Gert Bastian – Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Karl Bechert, Mainz – Petra K. Kelly, Nürnberg – D. Martin Niemöller, Wiesbaden – Prof. Dr. Helmut Ridder, Gießen – Christoph Strasser, Münster – Gösta von Uexküll, Hamburg – Josef Weber, Köln

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